Introduction
In this paper, we will revisit and rectify the dominant everyday understanding of "innovation". This too often appears too simplistic and naïve, in everyday rhetoric, consciousness, and policies, and sometimes even in academic conceptualizations. It too often appears to be reduced to some quasi-automatic, predominantly technical change, rather than interdependent technical and behavioral change coevolving. Also, it too often is considered to be just some fundamentally "positive", always improving things per se and providing some welfare-enhancing excess of Schumpeterian creation over Schumpeterian destruction, while, in fact, it should be judged as a complex process proper, a core of a complex adaptive economic system (an economic CAS) and its evolutionary dynamic; and as such, it is to be considered against the broad socio-economic and societal, common and collective real-world problems that it solves -or does NOT solve, either by being completely blocked and not occurring at all, or by occurring but being flawed, degenerated, counterproductive, and even counteracted by agents under inappropriate conditions. Particularly, neoclassical and neoliberal economics and politics, which have been enforced for four decades now, have made people believe that any "change" in a "market economy", generated by its de-regulated, autonomous "supply side" working, is an "innovation" per se, thus a "good thing", a "progress" and an "opportunity" (a "technological optimism"). But as we will see, the usual neoliberal nexus of "market" de-regulation, privatization, and austerity policy, particularly stressing labor-market and innovation "flexibilities", usually has, in face of the reality of economic CAS, counterproductive effects on agents' and thus the entire system's true, longer-run flexibility and innovation capacity (e.g., Kleinknecht et al., 2015; Dosi et al., 2018) .
Innovation thus appears as a black box in its overall use. That is, it lacks a criterion to distinguish counterproductive change -e.g., a dynamic perceived by agents as over-turbulent, overly complex, and cognitively overstressing, or some flawed, misled, degenerated, and futile "change" under fundamental uncertainty and opacity of agents -from some welfareenhancing innovation proper.
Insights from complexity sciences and economic CAS, in fact, suggest that "innovation" may be anything between flexible, smooth, improving change on the one hand and a highly idiosyncratic and turbulent motion on the other, perceived as over-complex, then often triggering conservative ("anti-innovative") Polanyian countermotions by cognitively overstrained agents (both humans and firm organizations).
Therefore, innovation is not sufficiently considered in mainstream thought to be highly dependent on idiosyncratic configurations of factors, if it really is to serve broad socioeconomic problem-solving and betterment. Rather, it is mostly simply considered easily feasible, "manageable", and improving anytime under any "market" working.
So innovation can only be properly explained if embedded in a modern complexity economics (CE) framework, where new critical factors of a "deep" (interaction) structure of CAS come to the fore. In dealing with real-world economies and their continuing idiosyncratic change as CAS, the theoretical challenge then is the identification of the self-organization mechanisms constituting its emergent dynamics and emergent structures, and namely those mechanisms that exist in real capitalist economies. They make that CAS undergo sudden turbulent changes as well as some lasting stasis in so-called (unstable) fixed points or (transient) attractor areas, often to be conceived as a lock-in or a hysteresis (or ratchet) in an inferior state. It should have become apparent that innovation economics is one of the fields proper related to CAS and their idiosyncratic dynamics.
We will further derive some typical policy implications of CE, indicating that a new policy paradigm is to be suggested in order to deal with real-world economies as CAS. And we will apply such insights to sketch a "complexity innovation policy". This paper is structured as follows. Section 1 briefly describes CE and CAS as a theoretical framework for our further analysis. Section 2 concentrates on self-organisation mechanisms to help understanding of innovation. Section 3 displays some basic ideas for a "complexity innovation policy". Section 4 introduces implications of conceptualising innovation as a prime field of complexity economics. Section 5 considers selected recent critical innovation literature and argues that it all points to innovation, innovation economics, and innovation policy having complexity perspectives. Section 6 delves into some real-world "self-organisation" mechanisms in capitalist systems, which may explain the problematic aspects of many innovations, as indicated in section 5. The paper ends with Conclusion.
Emerging structures and dynamics in economic systems:
Cognitive capacities, arena size, emergent institutions, and network structures "Markets", in reality, in fact are networks. Ideal, "perfect" "markets", and the largely deregulated ones in reality (i.e., designed, created, shaped, and regulated after the simplistic ideal), might be considered complete networks (if not dimensionless "point markets" or Walrasian-auctioneer star networks). However, a complete network, in reality, would Elsner W.
quickly generate a high complexity, in terms of the number of relations at least, with a growing number of agents: r(n) = n(n-1)/2, an exponential increase of potential interactions/ relations.
In addition, if agents have to deal with real-world problems, such as coordination or social dilemma (SD) problems (modeled as normal-form games), while always having several options to behave, such as, for instance, attempting to exploit others, or to share information with them, then there usually are more or less intricate problems involved in ideal, decentralized complete networks, such as collective-good problems. Then, in fact, a minimum of four potential relations between each two players exist, and complexity tends to further increase. With, say, eight agents, the number of potential relations would increase, according to r(n) = [n(n-1)/2]4, to 112 potential relations. And here the mere increase of the number of agents might, in an evolutionary process in a population, be complemented by a diversification of the kinds of agents: many and diverse agents might emerge, thus a higher complexity.
Anthropological research informs us that stable migrating and settling bands of hunters and gatherers had the size order of 35 agents, and larger clans (with, on average, less intensive relations and less frequent interactions between any two) displayed the size order of 150 members, as cognitively established in the phases of early human development, when social-emotional capacities, face recognition etc. developed together with the (biologically relatively late) development of the neocortex part of the human brain (e.g., Dunbar, 2008) . Genetic, cognition, neuro and brain sciences have confirmed this social-brain thesis, and the relevant maximum group sizes that humans can cognitively accommodate at certain interaction-intensity levels (e.g., Marlowe, 2005) and within which they still can generate sufficiently high expectations of cooperation, or what we will call general trust: A high general trust would be embodied as a cooperation expectation vis-à-vis a "stranger" in an expected one-shot interaction.
Beyond group size, subject to constellations of other factors (emotional intensity and density of interaction, intensity of mobility, fierceness of incentive structures, group network structure and others), over-complexity and over-turbulence may easily be perceived, with potential disadvantageous consequences for the system, regarding agents' cognitive capacity and subjective willingness to remain open to change, i.e., their attitude and proclivity to be innovative in a broad sense. So arena sizes, in which interactions take place, their initial or emerged network structures, and the related cognitive conditions, including experienced expectations to meet a cooperator next interaction, will thus be themes from CE for the analysis of the innovation potential of an economy and a corresponding innovation policy.
What then do agents really do in face of ubiquitous possibilities of perceived overcomplexity and over-turbulence? In fact, they strive to reduce complexity, always adapt it to their cognitive capacity, restrict arena and group sizes, select partners as far as possible (some "preferential attachment" or "selective mixing"), and try to extend (prolongate) interactions with those partners, with whom they perform successfully and whom they have learned to trust. They strive to establish stable patterns in their relations, not only according to family and kin, but also to spatial/social neighborhood.
In the pursuit of avoiding over-turbulence, people often invent, develop, and carry out Polanyian counter movements against de-regulated and globalized (highly anonymous) "market" environments (Polanyi, 1944) . And even the largest "global (firm) players" strive to reduce perceived over-turbulence and partially exclude the mechanisms of the "market": Their most sensitive research, technology, and production divisions will be locally clustered and networked with other firms' divisions, and manifold forms of frequent and stable cooperative interaction will be established, as known since A. Marshall's agglomeration studies (Marshall, 1890 (Marshall, /1920 . This is why we talk about "meso" sizes, "regionalization", "glocalization" and the like.
In fact, many relevant processes and self-organization mechanisms lead to emerging right-skewed statistical distributions with heavy (long, fat) tails, rather than representing random processes, which would entail normal distributions as assumed in stochastic versions of neoclassical (financial "market") models. Long-tail distributions have been empirically found for income and wealth (Pareto, 1897) , firm sizes ("Gibrat's Law"), city sizes ("Zipf's Law"), asset prices and returns, price changes, or financial-speculation sector agents' centralities, further appearances of words in languages, citations in citation networks, and many others.
Under mechanisms that generate such distributions, major sudden system motions, such as economic and financial crises, will occur with higher probabilities than under random process and normal distributions, the now famous black-swan phenomena (e.g., Taleb, 2007) , "improbable" under presumed Gaussian normal distributions, for which such relevant areas hardly exist. And the "tail" makes a considerable difference: The system-relevant agents, the "too-big-to-fails" or "tail risks" are located there, on the far right of the distributions, with multiple size orders of power and centrality than the average.
Theorizing CAS and innovation: Self-organization mechanisms,
and over-and under-innovation In a CE perspective, socio-economies are CAS • consisting of many and (potentially) heterogeneous components, in micro-based systems usually individual agents, with different behavioral/strategic options, which are; • directly interacting (often repeatedly) with each other in a manifoldly structured population (an IN) (spatially, behaviorally, …); • in different more or less intricate problem (decision, incentive) structures (SDs/ PDs, coordination/stag hunt/battle-of-the-sexes, chicken/anti-coordination or discoordination games); • with (initial) fundamental (strategic) uncertainty between each two agents;
• on different potential network topologies with (social or spatial) neighborhoods as well as long-distance interactions (e.g., among gate-keepers), all of them usually endogenously changing in a process; • with agents re-acting and adapting to each other to the average performance of their neighborhoods, their peer groups, to local or global conditions of the system (depending on their information), through search, learning, imitation, experimentation etc.; • in real historical time and sequentiality (action-reaction chains); • in non-trivial and systematic ways (e.g., imitating, herding, anticipating …), depending on different social organization mechanisms; • with non-linear aggregation resulting, often with destabilizing (disequilibrating) cumulative (positive) feedback loops; • thus generally path-dependent and non-ergodic in their historical development;
• with a wide variety of dynamics resulting: high idiosyncrasies (bifurcations and sometimes "deterministic chaos"; see, e.g., the famous "logistics map", May 1976) or high rigidities (fixed points/attractors), usually transitory; • and a number of other emergent system properties, such as certain persistent structures -which then cannot be traced back to the properties of the individual agents (the very definition of "emergence"); • indicating particular "self-organization" mechanisms;
• usually generating multiple transient equilibria (e.g., Kauffman, 1993) ;
• with an emergence of structures and properties "from the bottom up" at "meso" (subsystem) and "macro" (system) levels, but also subsequent reconstitutive downward effects onto individual behaviors (both restricting and empowering); • in a multi-level system, micro -meso -macro, with levels interacting.
Both emergent structures and dynamic properties of CAS thus stem from self-organization mechanisms, which form the theoretical-analytical research program proper of CE (e.g., Kauffman, 1993) . Self-organized systems often return to some relatively stable path again after having gone through some highly volatile phase or "crisis" (so-called phase transitions into so-called "deterministic chaos"). They then display some "meta-attractor", or "selforganized criticality", increasing their complexity "in some order" again, approaching the next highly volatile phase (e.g., repeated capitalist and particularly financial-sector crises). Note that the dynamic properties of CAS usually also display a right-skewed distribution of the sizes of repeated critical motions, be it such different systems as sand-pile or snow avalanches, earth quakes, or financial sector crises. This indicates that some same selforganizations mechanisms may be working even after repeated crises and at different system scales.
Given the different adverse self-organization mechanisms in decentralized spontaneous capitalist "market" economies, we need to consider badly adapted socio-economic systems indeed, which may well run into repeated crises. Thus we need to consider inner conditions, self-organization mechanisms, of socio-economic CAS that may render them subject to repeated crisis and manifold other malperformance, including non-resilience and, last not least, over-and under-innovation.
For instance, Heinrich (2016a Heinrich ( , 2018 has considered evolutionary systems and processes under the criterion of optimal "forgetting", or information loss or retention. Under combinations of insufficient vs. excessive diversity generation (too little and too much innovation) and insufficient vs. excessive selection pressure of a system, only certain areas of combinations of levels of diversity generation and selection pressure will entail proper rates of information loss or retention, and thus system resilience. Outside these areas, systems will be subject to non-resilience, insufficient adaptability, or even elimination of the entire population.
As an example, consider the financial-speculation sector with its repeated major crises, where product and behavioral standardization, imitation, and herd behavior under uncertainty, cumulative centrality, size, and power concentration, and fat-tailed centrality distribution may entail insufficient diversity generation (too little information variance), while fierce rivalry and a race for profit may lead to excessive selection pressure (too little stability or too fast information loss), which in total may entail considerable loss of resilience, reflected by repeated "phase transitions" into disorder, chaos, or crisis.
Note that a typical self-organization mechanism in physical and economic network analysis has been coined by physicists "the-rich-get-richer" or the above-mentioned "preferentialattachment" mechanism (Barabási, Albert, 1999) : The more relations or power etc. an entity has, the more it tends to get, thus some positive-feedback cumulative mechanism working among entities, which will be reflected in the skewed distribution structures above.
Some basic policy implications
In response to the 2000ff. dotcom and 2008ff. financial crises, there occurred some upsurge in elaborating policy implications of CE (e.g., Taleb, 2007; OECD, 2017; Chen, 2010; Room, 2011; Fontana, 2012; Colander, Kupers, 2014; Geyer, Cairney (Eds.), 2015) . Some exemplary policy orientations elaborated in this literature include the following:
• Socio-biologist D.S. Wilson (2016) demonstrated that all complex systems are somehow (self-) regulated and that the idea of a maximal de-regulation would be downright absurd. Rather, elaborating the right kind of regulation and a "wise managing of evolutionary process" would be the issue at stake (also, e.g., Clement, Puranam, 2017 ).
• Many complexity economists elaborated the orientation towards a control of the processes behind right-skewed (long-tail or heavy-tail, and often power-law) centrality distributions, namely avoiding too many, too big, and too long-lasting power and centrality positions, i.e., the big financial and industrial corporations, which are the "tail risks", and their property rights often cumulatively favored in the "market" and by the governments (e.g., Gueth et al., 2013 ).
• Further, "complexity policy" orientations have been elaborated with a focus on generally dampening the volatility and idiosyncrasy of CAS, stabilizing the system by reducing financial leverages, cumulative mechanisms in general (such as imitation and herding behavior), and related positive feedback loops (e.g. Room, 2011).
• In particular, problem-solving institutionalization may be promoted as stabilizing "institutional control variables" (Room, 2011) and even complexity-harnessing devices (e.g., Page, 2012; Bednar, Jones-Rooy, Page, 2015; Clement, Puranam, 2017) , preferably by shaping framework conditions to publicly support learning of informal institutionalization of cooperation among the private agents.
• In general, the higher complexity of the political control system over the controlled target system, i.e., its higher capacity to assume a large variety of system states, together with the computational capacities required for such a qualified future state agency, have become major issues (see already Ashby, 1956; more recently: Velupillai, 2005 ; also, e.g., Clement, Puranam, 2017) .
Implications for conceptualizing innovation and innovation policy
In socio-economic CAS, innovation can never be anything "outside" the system; it always is endogenous to the complex system and part of its development and change, thus coevolving, also together with the sectoral, distributional, institutional, and macro-aggregate structures. It also is always broadly understood as both technical and related behavioral change, coevolving, given the microeconomic problem structures (interdependence/decision structures) and the self-organization mechanisms at work.
The character and the particularities of innovations are depending on the structure, dynamics, and states of the system, and range from completely blocked innovations to different forms of welfare-enhancing but also of kinky, perverted, degenerated or otherwise negative unintended forms and effects of innovations (e.g., Kingston, 2017; Lueders et al. (Eds.), 2017; Grant, Moses, 2017; von Schomberg, Hankins (Eds.), 2018) . Whether intended "welfare-improving" innovations do come about or are blocked, get locked-in or appear degenerated in other ways, will depend on, as already indicated:
• the size of INs and ENs of a relevant population, e.g., whether they are too large to generate sufficient general expectations, in any interaction, to "meet cooperative interaction partners (again) next interaction" (the general trust in a population or relevant group); • the structure of IN/EN, e.g., whether they are highly concentrated and centralized, hierarchical, and fat-tail distributed in centrality degree and power or more evenly distributed; • the kind and severity (intricacy) of the problem situations agents usually face in their everyday interactions, e.g., whether they usually face fierce SD problems with high incentives to hyper-rational maximization, resulting in cultures of short-termism and "the-winner-takes-it-all"; • related degrees of (perceived) complexity and turbulence in the relevant repeated decision situation, arena, group, population, or network, given agents' cognitive capacities, e.g., whether there is high mobility and turnover among agents, each then frequently meeting complete strangers, or dense and lasting interaction generating acquaintances, who then have relatively high longer-run incentives to develop cooperation; • the degree of learned and habituated institutions of cooperation and of the establishment of their carrier groups and EN platforms;
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• the related average futurity orientation, or long-termism of expectations, decision, action, and planning horizons, and possible related calculations, within a relevant group; • the self-organization mechanisms predominant in a population, e.g., whether agents mostly orientate toward the most central agents and preferentially attach to them, imitate them, herd , follow short-or long-term incentives, etc.; • the degree, in which a system tends to become locked-in in certain established technologies and, usually after an overly long lock-in, follow a corresponding "old", "outmoded", "degenerated", and "petrified" institution (e.g., David, 1985; Elsner, 2012) ; • more general, the frequency and duration, in which a system is moving into, or remains in, an institutionally conditioned attractor area, and whether this attractor is superior or inferior to what is aspired by private and/or policy agents; • finally, then also the degree, in which the system by itself, or through some superior, well-informed, and dominating regulating policy, is able to generate mechanisms for proper combinations of stability and flexible change, standardization / institutionalization and diversification, lock-in and break-out, to prevent a process where stability degenerates into petrified lock-in, e.g., to prevent the "rich getting ever richer", the powerful ever more powerful, the central becoming more central. This is to break up positive feedback loops, to trigger diversity and parallel standards, without destroying required coordinating technical standards and corresponding behavioral institutions, to set new incentives and regulations, through a qualified, well-informed, and high-capacity state and its superior collective rationality. This is a delicate process and a delicate policy fine-tuning required, and to seed new standards and institutions will be feasible only within appropriate time windows (e.g., Heinrich, 2013 Heinrich, , 2016b . With this, it becomes obvious that innovation in the real-world is highly dependent, contingent, and idiosyncratic, as the CAS itself, and may easily become the contrary of its usually alleged "welfare-enhancing" connotation -unless embedded in a carefully shaped and regulated set of conditions. We will consult some related phenomena and conclusions as stated in the most recent critical and complex innovation literature.
Innovation as a prime field of complexity economics
Under conditions of (over-) complexity of de-regulated capitalist "market" systems with their often adverse self-organization mechanisms, it comes with no surprise that we increasingly encounter idiosyncratic innovation, and unintended and "wicked" aspects of innovation become more blatant, while institutions, rather than coordinating in problemsolving ways, often quickly ossify under ubiquitous power structures (and right-skewed distributions) and adverse incentives to hyper-rational short-run maximization. A general status-quo orientation, conservativism, and individual, social, and political regression, hostile to broadly problem-solving innovation, then may spread, as can often be observed in the neoliberal and financialized "market" economies nowadays.
Some brief examples from the critical recent innovation literature include:
• Perceived over-complexity and over-turbulence often render socio-economic CAS counter-productive indeed, generating individual and systemic rigidities through adverse cognitive conditions and too low general trust, entailing reduced innovation or flawed or pseudo innovation, often with high social costs (e.g., Vega-Redondo, 2013; Kleinknecht et al., 2015; Grant, Moses, 2017; Lueders et al. (Eds.), 2017; Sautua, 2017) , while sufficient stability levels would provide conditions of realistic selfconfidence and thus future investments of agents (e.g., Dessi, Zhao, 2017) .
• Financialization, then, through its incentives for speculators to short-run redistribution, defection and exploitation, profit reaping, and rent-seeking, enforces myopia and a winner-takes-all culture, reduces social commitment, and may displace behavioral and technological innovation (e.g., Kingston, 2017; Lueders et al. (Eds.), 2017) .
• Competition, then, may become too fierce, a counter-productive, destructive, powerrelated rivalry, which may decrease innovation in favor of power and monopolization strategies (e.g., Boudreau, Lacetera, Lakhani, 2008 ).
• Large, monopolized firms (the "tail risks" mentioned), in particular, may change the character of innovation into a tool for predation and redistribution, rather than socioeconomic progress and development ("predatory innovation", Schrepel, 2017) , while "inequality (of information in that case-WE) causes economic collapse" (Goerner, 2017) or long-run slack and stagnation, the late-Schumpeter ("Schumpeter Mark II") scenario.
• Schumpeter's earlier (Schumpeter Mark I) usually positively connoted creative destruction then also may fundamentally change its character, and austerity, reduction, exclusive, protected, and hidden-away information, and thus forms of destruction may easily outpace creation, again a scenario consistent with the late Schumpeter (e.g., Komlos, 2014; Swann, 2015; Godin, Vinck, 2017; Langley, Tulloch, 2017) . In all, there is overwhelming indication that innovation is, and should be conceptualized and analyzed, as a genuinely endogenous, uncertain, procedural and path-dependent, nonlinear and non-ergodic, systemic and network-based, non-"equilibrium" and non-"optimal" phenomenon, idiosyncratically dependent on institutions and regulations in order to release its welfare-enhancing potential and increase the dynamic resilience of the innovation process. Thus we contend that innovation, innovation economics, and innovation policy are all complex dynamical phenomena par excellence, prime fields of real-world complexity and CE (e.g., Lueders et al. (Eds.), 2017; Ruth, Goessling-Reisemann (Eds.), 2018; von Schomberg, Hankins (Eds.), 2018) .
To further substantiate this, we need to take a closer look at the "self-organization mechanisms" working in the "deep structure" of real-world capitalist "market" economies. We can do this only in brief and exemplary ways, but it is here, where the theoretical core of CE is, its theoretical "proof of the pudding".
6. The theoretical research program: Exploring and shaping self-organization mechanisms in our socio-economies In economic theory exist well-elaborated components of adverse technology-related selforganization-mechanisms, such as scale economies in production and network-externalities in the use of network-technologies. With their implied required coordination through immanent tendencies towards technological standardization, they may push some favorable innovation for some time, but also may get locked-in quite quickly, if some homogeneous oligopolization (or even strict monopolization) takes hold (the famous technological lockin; Arthur, 1989) . Inferior technologies then may easily prevail, and break-out, then, will not be easy to implement and may require costly major turbulences, i.e., phase transitions / bifurcations and phases of chaos/catastrophe, i.e., some crisis, by which a new and better technology could be made feasible as a new systemic attractor (e.g., Heinrich, 2013 Heinrich, , 2016b . Note that rivalling network technologies with their respective standards usually require installed bases so large as to allow, at best, only for very few global corporate players and narrow oligopolistic structures. And among the costs of break out of a "petrified" (locked-in) technological path may be longer phases of severe oligopolistic standard wars and lack of coordination or cooperation.
In fact, human agents in complex systems may strive to reduce uncertainty, perceived (over-) complexity and (over-) turbulence of their decision situation, not only by learning Elsner W.
instrumental institutions to improve their outcomes in the longer-run, but also by trying to improve at the expense of others, exploitation and redistribution, a myopic behavior, striving for differential status and power, the ceremonially motivated behavior. In this case, an emerged and initially instrumental institution may degenerate through an ever more unequal distribution of its initial collective cooperation benefits. Thus, self-organization mechanisms as reflected by institutionalization may trigger social costs rather than welfareenhancing innovations.
At the system level, this may generate forms of either some instrumental stability and continuing problem-solving change, which may give room for value creation and innovations proper, or some ceremonial petrifaction, rigidity, hysteresis, lock-in etc.
This was already a core part of the microfoundations of the original evolutionaryinstitutional economics of Thorstein Veblen (e.g., 1899): The particular social interaction (self-organization) mechanisms in what he considered historically received "predatory" societies, namely "invidious" differentiation from those in one's own social layer, exemplified in "conspicuous consumption", and striving to emulate those at higher societal layers, will lead to a ubiquitous struggle for relative social positioning, paradoxically reducing social mobility, entailing fashion waves, herding, and a "trickle-down" of the values and behaviors of the top social strata throughout society to the lowest social tiers, a paradox reduction of diversity, tending to make society behaviorally uniform, reducing diversity and eventually systemic resilience. Such socio-economies tend to generate little innovation benefitting the societal and ecological commons.
Different self-organization mechanisms would be statistically reflected by different distributional centrality structures, representing different network structures and types, and by different system dynamics (e.g., Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, Tahbaz-Salehi, 2017; Schlossberger, 2017) , including very different innovation performances.
Conclusion
In this paper, we strived to demonstrate that, if we assume the perspective of all modern sciences, namely systemic complexity, then the whole idea, conception, causalities, processes, and policies of innovation become much broader, simultaneously behavioral and technological, it becomes genuinely endogenous to the myriad of microeconomic "deep" interaction processes of the system, and less obviously just desirable and improving, but more contingent, idiosyncratic, and open.
But we then may also derive some more effective innovation-policy orientations, embedded in a systemic, institutional and "double-interactive" complexity policy, targeting no less than the most basic problems and mechanisms of socio-economies. Such policy will largely be a framework-policy approach, setting arena sizes and structures, interaction conditions and institutions, regulating critical factors, shaping cognitive, informational, and "expectational" conditions, mainly shaping the critical factors that tend to change system structures and dynamics towards the better, sometimes heavily and lastingly intervening, sometimes only briefly "nudging", as depending on the state and heading of the system. Such policy must be based on a superior complexity of the policy system itself, which then can assume more states that the target system, further, on the state's deeper knowledge and permanent complex anticipatory analysis of the socio-economic target system, its structures ("initial", "emerging", and "aimed at") and dynamics. Government and state would not the least have to use big data, big computation, modeling, simulations, and algorithms, to shape interaction conditions to make private agents interactively adapt their behaviors and generate instrumental institutions of cooperation, i.e., towards system attractors that are considered superior (at least transitorily). We have called this also an interactive policy, which is "double-interactive" in the sense that it neatly interacts with the interaction systems of the privates, sets its necessary regulations and shapes its favorable conditions, and then relies on adaptive interactions of the private.
